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1.  The extent of smuggling of migrants and human trafficking from Afri-
ca to the EU 
 
Following the incident of April 2015, when 800 people lost their life 
in the Mediterranean Sea, the EU has concentrated its efforts on 
fighting the smuggling of migrants by sea, with the European Council 
emphasising that all efforts should be made to prevent the loss of life in 
the sea, including by cooperating with transit and origin countries of 
migrants.1 Hence, in May 2015, a EU Council Decision (Council) on the 
military operation called EU Naval Force for the Mediterranean Sea 
(EUNAVFOR MED) was adopted in order to detect the smuggling of 
migrants in the Southern Central Mediterranean Sea.2 The military op-
eration was renamed Sophia after a baby who was born on a boat which 
was rescued by the EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia), on 22 Au-
gust 2015.3 On 20 June 2016, the Council extended Operation Sophia’s 
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1 See European Union Naval Force-Mediterranean Operation Sophia, Update: 1 
July 2016 <www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/ 
factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf>. 
2 See Council Decision 2015/778/CFSP of 18 May 2015 [2015] OJ L122/31.  
3 See ‘EU Names Anti-Human-Smuggling Mission ‘Operation Sophia’ (28 
September 2015) <www.wsj.com/articles/eu-names-anti-human-smuggling-mission-
operation-sophia-1443471234>. See also I Mercone, ‘Some notes on the relations 
between UNSC resolution 2240 (2015) fighting smugglers in Mediterranean and 
EUNAVFOR Med “Sophia” Operation’ <http://free-group.eu/2015/10/19/some-notes-
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mandate until 27 July 2017, reinforcing it by adding two supporting 
tasks, namely: training of the Libyan coastguard and navy; and contrib-
uting to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas 
off the coast of Libya4.  The aim of the Decision is ‘to identify, capture 
and destroy vessels before they are used by traffickers’5 and consists of 
three phases which are analysed in section 2 of this article.   
Ten months after Operation Sophia transitioned from phase 1 to 
phase 2 and after the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2240 
(2105), it is opportune to evaluate the effectiveness of the Operation.  
The issue will be addressed by analysing the crime of smuggling of 
migrants; the response given by the EU through the establishment of a 
military operation; the contribution of the UN Security Council resolu-
tion; and whether this contribution is adequate and can make the differ-
ence in the fight against smuggling of migrants by sea. In order to answer 
the question, the article will also refer to recent investigations conducted 
in Palermo (Italy) on smuggling of migrants committed by a criminal 
network in different countries in Africa, Europe, Australia and Canada. 
Smuggling of migrants is a very complex crime which can take place 
not only by sea but also by air and land. Smuggling by land may take 
place from Turkey to Bulgaria, from Ethiopia to Libya through Sudan, 
from Pakistan to Turkey through Iran.6 Migrants who are waiting in 
Greece, are smuggled through Macedonia to Serbia and Hungary.7 
Usually migrants wait in small villages for days before being recruited 
by smugglers. In the central Saharan, journeys are managed by the “Af-
rod” system which is controlled by Tuareg transport entrepreneurs. 
They connect Northern Niger, Algeria and parts of Libya and are able 
on-the-relations-between-unsc-resolution-2240-2015-fighting-smugglers-in-mediterranean-
and-the-eunavfor-med-sophia-operation/>. 
4 See ‘EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: mandate extended by one year, two 
new tasks added’, Council Press Release (20 June 2016) <www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
en/press/press-releases/2016/06/20-fac-eunavfor-med-sophia/>. 
5 See Council Decision 2015/778 (n 2) para 3. 
6 See European Commission, ‘A Study on Smuggling of Migrants. 
Characteristics, Responses and Cooperation with Third Countries: Final Report’ 
(September 2015) 38 ff <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/ 
networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/ study_on_smuggling_ 
of_migrants_final_report_master_091115_final_pdf.pdf>.  
7 ibid. 
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to carry two or three dozen individuals.8 There are then other criminal 
groups controlled by Tebu, Hausa and Arab, criminal groups involving 
large trucks which are able to transport up to 120 migrants. Smuggling 
of migrants by land and in the desert can take several weeks because of 
the unstable situation in countries which are crossed by smugglers and 
which can cause delays in the journeys.9 There is evidence showing that 
migrants are often abandoned in the desert when trucks encounter dif-
ficulties in the various transit countries.10 Several incidents were report-
ed in 2015 and migrants have died in the Sahara desert, particularly in 
Niger, whilst trying to reach Europe.11 In the EU, tragedies were also 
reported in 2015 whilst migrants were trying to cross different countries 
by hiding in trucks. The most tragic fatality was discovered in Austria 
where 71 people were found dead in a truck.12 
Smuggling by sea routes usually consist of transporting migrants from 
their place of accommodation in Hub cities to places of embarkation.13 
Smugglers are able to adapt their routes on the basis of where the interna-
tional search and rescue operations take place and the weather condi-
tions.14 There is evidence that in Libya criminal organisations have been 
supported by Libyan security officials and migrants have been shipped to 
Europe at prearranged times in order to avoid controls undertaken by of-
ficials in charge of search and rescue operations.15 Before commencing 
their trips, it has been reported that migrants are provided with a satellite 
phone, GPS and a list of contacts which allow them to contact Maltese or 
Italian authorities in order to be rescued. If they are not rescued by these 
authorities, they are rescued by private ships and merchant vessels. Inci-
dents have been reported in the Eastern Mediterranean route and partic-
ularly between migrants who have crossed the Turkish coast, the Greek 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid. 
10 ibid. 
11 ibid. 
12 See Frontex, ‘Risk Analysis for 2016’ (March 2016) 47 <http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf>. 
13 ibid 39. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
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Islands and the Evros River.16 Fatalities have also been reported in the 
Western Mediterranean route between Morocco and Spain.17 
Smuggling can be carried out by air through falsification of docu-
ments as reported by Frontex in 2015.18 This agency has also reported 
that in the second half of 2015, people entering the EU were mainly 
from Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Morocco and Cameroon and 
that they crossed the EU borders illegally not only from Mediterranean 
routes but also from other routes such as Eastern European and West-
ern Balkan routes.19 In April, Frontex reported that most people cross-
ing the EU borders illegally, were from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, 
Pakistan, Morocco, Somalia, Nigeria and Palestine.20 Most recently, 
Frontex has reported that people from Sub-Saharan Africa are ‘the sin-
gle largest group being detected/rescued’21 in the central Mediterranean 
route. Certainly, according to Frontex, the Mediterranean route re-
mains the most transited route.22  
Smuggling of migrants is supported by coordinators, organisers, re-
cruiters, transporters, spotters, drivers, messengers, enforcers, service 
providers and suppliers.23 In the last years, smuggling of migrants has 
become more organised and professional.24 Smuggler networks rely on 
social media and it is almost impossible for migrants to travel on their 
own initiative, without the support of these criminal networks.25 In ad-
dition, migrants have to pay prices and fees for their journey and smug-
glers ‘tailor their prices to the economic means of their clients’.26 In oth-
er words, migrants pay what they can afford and usually Syrian refugees 
16 ibid 46. 
17 ibid. 
18 See Frontex, ‘Risk Analysis Quarter 2. April-June 2015’ 14 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q2_2015_final.pdf>. 
19 See Frontex, ‘Risk Analysis Quarter 3. July-September 2015’ 6 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2015.pdf>. 
20 See Frontex, ‘Risk Analysis Quarter 4. October-December 2015’ 10 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q4_2015.pdf>. 
21 See Frontex, ‘Risk Analysis Quarter 3’ (n 19) 12. 
22 ibid. 
23 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Issue Paper: A short introduction to 
migrant smuggling’ (2010) 14 <www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-
Smuggling/Issue-Papers/Issue_Paper_-_A_short_introduction_to_migrant_smuggling.pdf>. 
24 See European Commission, ‘A Study on Smuggling of Migrants’ (n 6) 48. 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid. 
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pay more than migrants coming from Sub-Saharan Africa as the former 
are healthier than the latter.27 Often migrants have to pay several times 
for each journey they undertake and the payment modalities have be-
come more organised compared to some years ago.28 Migrants who travel 
on the Southern Mediterranean route, for example, are requested to pay 
for their journey before they start travelling.29 If the journey is interrupted 
or the departure is halted, migrants do not have the right to a reimburse-
ment.30 Instead, for journeys from Pakistan to Greece, migrants can repay 
the price of their trip after safely arriving at an agreed destination.31  
The EU has responded to the level of smuggling of migrants by 
concentrating on smuggling of migrants by sea because so many people 
die whilst trying to reach EU by sea. The next section will examine Op-
eration Sophia, including the two phases which have been launched by 
the Council. 
 
 
2.  Operation Sophia 
 
Operation Sophia was launched on 22 June 2015 by the Council 
Decision (CFSP) 2015/972.32 Denmark decided not to take part in the 
military operation.33 Operation Sophia consists of three phases. In the 
first phase, Operation Sophia gathered information and will patrol the 
high seas in compliance with international law.34 In the second phase, 
the Operation boarded the suspect vessels, searched, seized and divert-
ed them in the high seas and in respect of international law, including 
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (Smuggling Protocol) and the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The second phase also con-
sisted of conducting boarding, search, seizure and diversion of suspect-
27 ibid. 
28 ibid 45. 
29 ibid 46. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid. 
32 See Council Decision 2015/972/CFSP of 22 June 2015 [2015] OJ L157/51. 
33 ibid para 3. 
34 See Council Decision 2015/778 (n 2) art 2(2)(a). 
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ed vessels within the territorial waters of the coastal State concerned. In 
the third phase, Operation Sophia will take necessary measures, to en-
sure that the vessels are made inoperable by disposing of them and de-
stroying vessels if this is necessary.35  
The legal basis of Operation Sophia are Article 42(4) and Article 
43(2) of the EU Treaty (TEU).36 Article 42(4) TEU states that ‘Deci-
sions relating to the common security and defence policy’, including 
military operations (which Operation Sophia is), shall be concluded ‘by 
the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an ini-
tiative from a Member State’. Article 43(2) TEU states that military op-
erations shall be adopted by Council decisions which shall establish the 
‘objectives’, ‘scope’ and ‘general conditions for their implementation’. 
Article 43(2) also states that the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) ‘acting under the authority of 
the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Se-
curity Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military 
aspects of such tasks’. Hence, Operation Sophia acts under the political 
control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC).37 The PSC directs the Operation under the responsibility of the 
Council and of the HR.38 In other words, Sophia will be accountable be-
fore the Council and the HR, which will exercise their control through 
the PSC. These institutions are inter-governmental and thus, Sophia is 
an inter-governmental operation and therefore not accountable to the 
European Parliament (EP). The EP has a very marginal role in the EU 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as it can only be consulted 
by the HR on the main aspects and the basic choices’39 of the CFSP and 
by the Council when agreements between the EU and third countries or 
with international organisations, related to the CFSP are concluded.40 
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has ruled a number of times on 
35 ibid art 2(c). 
36 ibid Preamble. 
37 ibid para 10 and art 6(1). 
38 ibid art 6(1). 
39 See art 36 TEU. 
40 See art 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).   
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the issue and confirmed that the EP has only a consultative role on the 
CFSP.41 
The Decision states that the Council will seek the participation of 
third States which ‘may be invited to participate in the operation’.42 The 
Decision also states that the third countries’ contribution will not put at 
risk EU decision-making autonomy and EU institutions independence.43 
Thus, agreements with third countries will be based on Article 218 
TFEU which states that agreements have to be authorised by the Coun-
cil after consulting the EP. By reading the provisions of the Council 
Decision, it might be assumed that the participation of third countries 
will concern the detection and disposal of vessels and that the Council 
may require their participation when vessels are detected in their terri-
torial waters. In this way, encroachment of national sovereignty will be 
avoided and third countries will participate in the military operation 
and cooperate to deal with vessels. EUNAVFOR will be authorised to 
release information to third countries and the UN, on the operation 
they are undertaking.44  
Since the adoption of the Decision, Sophia Operation has been crit-
icised for its ambiguous scope and lack of effectiveness. 45 In this regard, 
the Mejer Committee pointed out that ‘unlike piracy and international 
crimes, international law does not establish universal criminal jurisdic-
tion over human smuggling’.46 There is only the Smuggling Protocol 
41 See Case C-658/11 European Parliament v Council (ECJ. 24 June 2014). For a 
comment on the case see S Peers, ‘The CJEU ensures basic democratic and judicial 
accountability of the EU’s foreign policy’ (24 June 2014) 
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/06/the-cjeu-ensures-basic-democratic-and.html>. 
See also, for instance, Case C-317/04 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-04721; Case C-
403/05 Parliament v Commission [2007] ECR I-09045; Case C-130/10 Parliament v 
Council  (ECJ, 19 July 2012). See also Case C-263/14 Parliament v Council (pending).   
42 See Council Decision 2015/778 (n 2) art 9(1).  
43 ibid. 
44 ibid art 12. 
45 See Meijers Committee, ‘Military action against human smugglers: legal questions 
concerning the EUNAVFOR Med operation’ (23 September 2015) 
<www.statewatch.org/news/2015/sep/eu-meijers-cttee-eunavfor.pdf>. See also House 
of Lords European Union Committee, 14th report of Session 2015-16 ‘Operation 
Sophia, the EU’s naval mission in the Mediterranean: an impossible challenge’ (13 May 
2016) <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/144/144.pdf>. 
See also S Peers, ‘Analysis the EU’s Planned War on Smugglers’ (May 2015) 
<www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-268-eu-war-on-smugglers.pdf>. 
46 ibid. 
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which states that a ‘State Party shall take appropriate measures in ac-
cordance with relevant domestic and international law’ when evidence 
confirms that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea.47 
The EU Council Decision does not establish any rules on the apprehen-
sion, arrest and detention of smugglers of migrants. It is likely that the 
EUNAVFOR Council Decision does not establish rules on the arrest of 
smugglers because EUNAVFOR is a military task force and thus, they 
cannot carry out investigations on the smuggling of migrants. It is the 
police and prosecutors of EU Member States who have jurisdiction over 
investigations, not EUNAVFOR. Jurisdiction will be decided on the ba-
sis of Article 4 of the Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA.48 Article 4 
states that Member States will establish jurisdiction over assisting illegal 
migration, either when the crime is wholly or partially committed on 
their territory or when it is committed by one of their nationals or when 
it is committed for the benefit of a legal person established on their ter-
ritory. This provision has been complied with in recent investigations 
conducted by Italian public prosecutors in Palermo, which successfully 
detected a criminal network which smuggled migrants from Libya, Eri-
trea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Israel to Sicily.49 Subsequently, the same organisa-
tion smuggled migrants to Northern Italy and eventually to Sweden, 
Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Australia and 
Canada.50 Evidence on the crime of smuggling was gathered through 
wiretapping.51 The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation has admitted 
wiretapping as evidence as they have been made either from Italian tel-
ephones or to Italian telephones. This activity is not in breach of the na-
tional sovereignty of third countries as the wiretapping was wholly un-
dertaken on Italian territory52 and Article 4 of Framework Decision 
47 See art 8(7) Smuggling Protocol. 
48 See art 4 of the Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the 
strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, 
transit and residence [2002] OJ L 328/1. 
49 See Decreto di fermo ex art 384 c.p.p. disposto dal P.M. della Procura della 
Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Palermo, Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, 30 May 
2016, 16. 
50 ibid 2. 
51 ibid 20. 
52 ibid 20-21. See also Supreme Court of Cassation, Sez. IV, Judgement n. 32924 of 
29 July 2004, Belforte rv. 229103; Supreme Court of Cassation, Sez. V, Judgement 4401 
of 21 October 1998, Assisi. 
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2002/946/2002 states that Member States have jurisdiction over the 
crime of smuggling if part of the criminal activity is committed on their 
territory. In addition, national authorities can rely on the European Ar-
rest Warrant (EAW) if the crime has been committed in other EU 
Member States.53 Article 1(1) of the EAW Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA defines the EAW as  
 
‘a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest 
and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the 
purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial 
sentence or detention order.’ 
 
Article 1(2) states that the EAW is based on the principle of mutual 
recognition which permits the transfer of suspected criminals who sur-
render without applying the complex extradition procedures which 
cause delays in prosecuting criminals and executing judicial decisions.54 
Mutual recognition is based on mutual trust among Member States’ 
criminal justice systems, which is essential to give effectiveness to the 
EAW which ‘is the first measure to be adopted in the field and the only 
mutual recognition measure which has been implemented fully and in 
detail …’.55 Mutual recognition is ‘the “cornerstone” of judicial cooper-
53 See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the 
European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] 
OJ L 190/1. See also Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 
amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 
2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons 
and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions 
rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial [2009] OJ L 81/24. 
54 See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 (n 53) art 1(2) 
and Recital 5. For an in depth analysis of the principle of mutual recognition see Case 
C-396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu (ECJ, 29 January 2013) para 33; Case C-42/11 Lopes De 
Silva Jorge (ECJ, 5 September 2012) para 28; Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld 
v Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-03633, para 28; Case C-66/08 Kozłowski, 
[2008] ECR I-06041, paras 31 and 43; Case C-123/08 Dominic Wolzenburg [2009] ECR 
I-09621, para 56; Case C-261/09 Gaetano Mantello [2010] ECR I-11477, para 35. 
55 See V Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Se-
curity and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of 
the Individual’ (2012) 31 YB Eur L 323. For an in depth analysis of the correlation be-
tween mutual trust and mutual recognition see E Herlin-Karnel, ‘From mutual trust to 
the full effectiveness of EU law: 10 years of the European arrest warrant’ (2013) 38 Eur 
L Rev 79-91. On the shift of the EAW legislation from intergovernamentalism to supra-
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ation’.56 The EAW is an effective way to fight the trans-national crime of 
smuggling of migrants within the EU. However, if the activity should be 
undertaken entirely on the territory of a third country not belonging to 
the EU, the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust estab-
lished within the EU legal system, cannot be applied. 
The UN Security Council adopted resolution 2240 (2015) in Octo-
ber 2015, authorising Member States to intercept vessels from Libya 
suspected of smuggling of migrants and to ‘disrupt the organised crimi-
nal enterprises engaged in migrant smuggling and human trafficking’.57 
Nevertheless, as will be noted in the next section, the Security Council 
resolution does not set up rules on the arrest, detention and investiga-
tion of the crime, which are the most important actions that should be 
taken to detect smuggling of migrants by sea because the crime is trans-
national and requires cooperation in investigations and persecution 
within and outside the EU. 
 
 
3.  Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over migrant smuggling and hu-
man trafficking under the UN Security Council resolution 2240 
(2015) 
 
The Preamble of Security Council resolution 2240 (2015) states that 
it is urgent that ‘all States … comply with their obligations under inter-
national law, including international human rights law and international 
refugee law’.58 Actions in this direction have to be taken by Member 
States regardless of the immigration status of individuals as their human 
rights shall be respected without any discrimination between refugees 
and other migrants. The Security Council resolution focused mainly on 
cooperation with Libya by emphasising that in Libya, smuggling and 
trafficking networks could provide support to other criminal organisa-
nationalism see M Ventrella, ‘European integration or democracy disintegration in 
measures concerning police and judicial cooperation?’ (2013) 4 New J Eur Criminal L 
290-309. 
56 See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 (n 53) Recital 
6. 
57 See UN Security Council resolution 2240 (2015) UN Doc  S/RES/2240 (2015) (9 
October 2015) para 12. 
58 ibid Preamble. 
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tions and terrorist networks. For this reason, it is important that the 
Libyan government takes responsibility over the smuggling of migrants 
at sea.59 The Security Council resolution also stressed that the fighting 
against smuggling and trafficking should be tackled by immediate and 
long-term initiatives. For this purpose, the Security Council resolution 
requires Member States to cooperate with Libya and to coordinate ac-
tions against smuggling and trafficking.  
The Security Council resolution called upon Member States to take 
tough measures against vessels involved in smuggling and trafficking. 
First, the Security Council resolution authorizes Member States to in-
spect vessels on the high sea when there is the suspicion they are perpe-
trating smuggling and trafficking from Libya, provided that good faith 
efforts to obtain the consent of flag State have been done.60 Second, the 
Security Council resolution also states that in these exceptional circum-
stances, Member States can adopt further actions, including the seizure 
and disposal, with regard to vessels suspected of smuggling of migrants 
at sea.61 However, a question that is inadequately addressed in resolu-
tion 2240 (2015) relates to the kind of actions that Member States may 
take vis-à-vis the smugglers found on the inspected vessels. In para-
graph 10 of the resolution the Security Council authorizes Member 
States ‘to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances 
in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers …’.62 This word-
ing however does not seem to cover the question of the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction over smugglers and traffickers, insofar as another 
paragraph of the resolution calls upon all States ‘with relevant jurisdic-
tion under international law and national legislation, to investigate and 
prosecute persons responsible for acts of migrant smuggling and human 
trafficking at sea …”.63 
The Security Council resolution states that smuggling and traffick-
ing are two distinct crimes and requires Member States to tackle both 
crimes by the same short term measures, including the disposal of sus-
pected vessels.64 The resolution seems to underestimate the fact that 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid para 7. 
61 ibid para 8. 
62 ibid para 10. 
63 ibid para 15. 
64 ibid Preamble. 
 
 
14 QIL 30 (2016), 3-18              ZOOM IN 
smuggling can be a form of trafficking and that this may occur when 
migrants are tortured, raped and abused during their journeys.65 Mem-
ber States should take their responsibility and carry out investigations 
on smuggling, trafficking and their possible connections. The Security 
Council resolution generally focuses on shared responsibility but it is 
important to clarify where criminals should be prosecuted. This is an 
issue of national sovereignty which the resolution does not focus upon 
at all, as it simply states that the Security Council reaffirms ‘its strong 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and 
national unity of Libya’.66 International law as a whole does not address 
issues concerning national sovereignty in criminal investigations and in 
extra-territorial jurisdiction. Certainly, Article 3 of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNCTOC) applies 
when a crime has a cross-border dimension, but Article 4 establishes the 
sovereignty clause which imposes on State Parties an obligation not to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of another State Party.  Investigations 
over the smuggling of migrants, which is a trans-national crime, require 
investigative cooperation with origin and transit countries which might 
risk encroaching on national sovereignty. In criminal cases involving EU 
Member States, the EAW may serve as a useful tool for investigative 
cooperation. Some personal interview suggests that Italian public pros-
ecutors have issued the EAW on several occasions, and that this fa-
voured the interrogation and prosecution of criminals.67 However, if 
criminals were based in countries outside the EU, public prosecutors 
needed to conclude agreements with third States and many of them 
were unwilling to contribute in the investigations.68 Many other crimi-
nals may be at large because of the complexity of investigations and is-
sues related to national sovereignty. This latter problem remains unre-
solved by the Security Council resolution because it only focused on 
65 See European Commission, ‘A Study on Smuggling of Migrants’ (n 6). See also 
Amnesty International, ‘Libya: Horrific abuse driving migrants to risk lives in 
Mediterranean crossings’ (11 May 2015) <www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2015/05/ 
libya-horrific-abuse-driving-migrants-to-risk-lives-in-mediterranean-crossings/>. 
66 See UN Security Council resolution 2240 (2015) (n 57). 
67 In an e-mail exchange with one of the public prosecutors from Palermo, he 
highlighted that public prosecutors have issued the EAW on several occasions and in 
this way, criminals could be interrogated and prosecuted: e-mail interview undertaken 
with Dr Ferrara on 8 April 2016. 
68 ibid. 
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Operation Sophia by stating that its establishment ‘underlined the need 
for effective international action to address both immediate and long-
term aspects of migrant smuggling and human trafficking towards Eu-
rope’.69 The Commander of Operation Sophia emphasised that moving 
from the operation in the high seas (Phase 2A) to the operation in Liby-
an territorial waters (Phase 2B), may have political and legal implica-
tions, as not only the fight against smuggling requires the contribution 
of the Libyan authorities, but it might also imply the power to arrest, 
detain and prosecute smugglers.70 It has been reported that Libya de-
nies the possibility of undertaking investigations on their territory even 
though there are still migrants waiting to embark to Europe with more 
people arriving from Sub-Saharan Africa.71 The Commander pointed 
out that if Operation Sophia remains outside the Libyan territory, 
smugglers will not be apprehended.72  
Insofar as Operation Sophia, as shown in section 2 of this article, is 
carried out in the framework of CFSP and therefore remains an inter-
governmental operation, no progress has been made in EU police and 
judicial cooperation with transit and origin countries. The EU has es-
tablished the EAW and Justice and Home Affairs (JHAs) agencies such 
as Europol and Eurojust. However, these agencies are not adequate to 
lead effective actions against smugglers of migrants committed outside 
the EU. Europol does not have the powers of domestic police because 
the agency cannot initiate investigations.73 The same problem also af-
fects the ‘external’ side of Europol activity, as Europol can only ex-
change data with external agencies and third countries and it is not 
conceived as a European Police with investigative tasks.74  In addition, 
the agency lacks transparency because the reports they publish annual-
ly, despite being very informative, are written by Europol and only re-
69 ibid. 
70 See ‘EUNAVFOR MED-Operation Sophia. Six Monthly Report: June, 22nd to 
December 31st 2015’ (17 February 2016) <https://wikileaks.org/eu-military-
refugees/EEAS/EEAS-2016-126.pdf>. 
71 ibid. 
72 ibid. 
73 See Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European 
Police Office (Europol) [2009] OJ L121/37. Art 5 simply states that Europol has 
coordinating tasks as it can ask Member States to initiate investigations, although 
Europol cannot itself take this initiative. 
74 ibid art 23. 
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flect their position.75 Furthermore, Europol does not have democratic 
accountability,76 despite the fact that the EU is trying to make Europol 
more transparent and democratic.77  
Eurojust is not really in a better position. The agency was estab-
lished to improve judicial cooperation between Member States to better 
fight against trans-national criminal organisations.78 Nevertheless, its ex-
ternal scope is very limited. Article 27(3) of the Council Decision states 
that Eurojust can conclude cooperation agreements with third coun-
tries, if the Council agrees. The cooperation established by the Council 
Decision only concerns the exchange of personal data. Investigative co-
operation is not within the scope of the Decision. The same principles 
apply to international cooperation between Eurojust and third coun-
tries. Their cooperation will be mainly based on the exchange of infor-
mation, including personal data.79  
It is the present author’s view that the conclusion of cooperation 
agreements to fight against smuggling and trafficking would be en-
hanced by the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Of-
fice (EPPO), with the task of coordinating investigations between EU 
investigative authorities, such as Europol, and investigative authorities 
of countries of origin and transit of migrants. The European Council 
highlighted that smuggling of persons and trafficking in human beings 
are two crimes which require cooperation ‘which goes beyond the area 
of freedom, security and justice and (…) includes external relations’.80 
75 See S Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (OUP 2011) 932. 
76 See S Peers, ‘The reform of Europol: modern EU agency, or intergovernmental 
dinosaur?’ (18 June 2014) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/06/the-reform-of-
europol-modern-eu-agency.html>. 
77 See ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training (Europol) 
and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA’, COM (2013) 173 final, 27 
March 2013 <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/04-updated-
rules-for-europol/>. 
78 See Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust 
with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime OJ L 63/1, paras 1 and 3. 
79 See Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening 
of Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to 
reinforcing the fight against serious crime OJ L 138/14 art 26a(2). 
80 See ‘The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting Citizens’ (2 December 2009) C/115/1, para 4.4.2 <https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
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The Lisbon Treaty has introduced the possibility of establishing the 
EPPO ‘[i]n order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of 
the Union’.81 The Treaty also states that the EPPO’s scope can be ex-
tended ‘to include serious crime having cross-border dimension’82 and 
thus, the fight against smuggling and trafficking can be included. How-
ever, at the moment proposals on the establishment of the EPPO are 
only concentrated on fraud against the EU budget and corruption with-
in the EU.83 Furthermore, an attempt to establish the EPPO in the past, 
has been strongly criticized as it was considered to be an attempt to en-
croach national sovereignties.84 Hence, it can be concluded that neither 
the Security Council resolution nor the EU are appropriately addressing 
this problem, which concerns States’ responsibility and police and judi-
cial cooperation between the EU and countries where the crime of 
smuggling is committed. As the Meijer Committee emphasised, Opera-
tion Sophia could not meet the standards established in Articles 39 and 
42 of the UN Charter for the Security Council authorization of military 
operations, as the activities of human smugglers do not qualify per se as 
a threat to international peace and security.85 The aim of Operation So-
trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/the_stockholm_programme_-_an_open_and_secure 
_europe_en_1.pdf>. 
81 See art 86(1) TFEU. 
82 See art 86(4) TFEU. 
83 See ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European 
Public Prosecutor's Office’, COM (2013) 534 final, 17 July 2013, 4 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0534:FIN:en:PDF>. 
84 The UK criticised the EPPO project as an attempt to encroach upon national 
sovereignties in criminal law. See United Kingdom Response to the Commission Green 
Paper. The United Kingdom Parliament, Select Committee on European Communities, 
9th Report, ‘Prosecuting Fraud on the Communities’ Finances-The Corpus Juris’ (18 
May 1999). For an in-depth study of the EPPO, see ‘Green paper on the criminal-law 
protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a 
European Prosecutor’, COM (2001) 715 final, 11 December 2001 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52001DC0715>. See ‘Follow-
up report on the Green paper on the criminal-law protection of the financial interests of 
the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor’, COM (2003) 128 
final, 19 March 2003 <http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/fwk-green-paper-
corpus/corpus_juris_en.pdf>. See C Fijnaut, MS Groenhuijsen, ‘A European Public 
Prosecutor: Comments on the Green Paper’ (2002) 10 Eur J Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 321-336. See M Zwiers, The European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(Intersentia 2011). See LH Erkelens, AWH Meij, M Pawlik, The European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office. An Extended Arm or a Two-Headed Dragon? (Springer 2015). 
85 See Meijers Committee, ‘Military action against human smugglers’ (n 45) para 3. 
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phia seems to be more the achievement of peace and security by pre-
venting the illegal entry of migrants within EU Member States rather 
than saving the lives of migrants and preventing them from seeking the 
support of smugglers to leave their countries of origin. Migrants seek 
their support simply because legal routes have been banned and this 
fact has been confirmed by the investigations carried out on smuggling 
by Italian prosecutors in Palermo.86 The EU is addressing the problem 
using an inadequate military operation and the UN Security Council 
resolution is supporting this inadequate approach. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
The Security Council resolution 2240 (2015) appears inadequate to 
fight the smuggling of migrants by sea. This conclusion has been 
reached after having considered Operation Sophia which is a military 
operation and which only addresses smuggling committed between 
Libya to Italy. The article has shown that smuggling of migrants is 
committed in different countries and in different regions including Af-
rica, Europe and Canada. Hence, a military operation cannot address 
the problem appropriately as military forces do not have jurisdiction 
over investigations on smuggling.  
Adequate investigations on smuggling and trafficking can be carried 
out only if there is international investigative cooperation between po-
lice and judicial authorities of different regions. This is because investi-
gations on cross-border crimes are generally complex and the burden 
should not be left to single investigative offices. Unfortunately, the situ-
ation will not improve, as EU policy is concentrated on agreements to 
reduce the number of migrants and refugees in the EU87 and this will be 
detrimental to effective investigations on smuggling and trafficking 
committed in different regions of the world.  
 
86 See Decreto di fermo ex art 384 c.p.p. (n 49) 11. 
87 See ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ (18 March 2016) <www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/> and European Council 
Conclusions (17-18 March 2016) <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/03/18-european-council-conclusions/>.  
 
 
